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Preserving the Artistic Afterlife:
The Challenges in Fulfilling Testator
Wishes in Art-Rich, Cash-Poor Estates
Hanna K. Feldman*
Artists’ estates present unique legal issues distinct from the
estates of art collectors-cum-investors, as these estates tend to be
much more art-rich and cash-poor, leading to difficulties in funding
legacies when there is no cash readily available and all of the value
of the estate is tied up in the artworks themselves. Robert Indiana,
an American sculptor who was frequently exploited throughout his
life and now appears to be subject to posthumous exploitation, will
be examined as a textbook example of such an artist’s estate. The
issues surrounding Indiana’s estate exemplify the challenges in
following a testator’s intent to leave a lasting artistic reputation
when the artist has not also left behind the cash necessary to fund
their dreams. This Note looks at the judicial doctrines of cy pres and
equitable deviation and various legal scholars’ proposed solutions
to modifying such impracticable dreams, particularly in the case of
artists’ and art collectors’ estates. Specifically, the Note argues that
Indiana’s collection should not be housed in his ramshackle mansion on a rural island in Maine, but rather should be bequeathed to
the Farnsworth Museum in Rockland, Maine. Substantively, this
Note concludes that public benefit should prevail over dead hand
control in the case of artists’ estates.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Robert Indiana, an American sculptor who died in May 2018,
expressed his testamentary intent to create a museum out of his
sprawling mansion in which all the artworks in his collection,
including his own creations, would be housed.1 This noble and
worthy wish, however, was doomed from the start. Indiana’s estate,
like many other artists’,2 is art-rich and cash-poor, which means it is
1

See infra text accompanying notes 10–29.
Much like trends in other industries, there is an increasing income disparity between
the wealthiest artists, such as Christopher Wool, Peter Doig, and Richard Prince, and the
rest of artists, with 89% of the Contemporary Art market turnover being generated by its
500 most successful artists, in a pool of over 20,000 artists. Deceased artist Jean-Michel
Basquiat, Doig, and Rudolf Stingel together accounted for 22% of the market’s sales. The

2
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filled with artworks considered illiquid assets as they are hard to sell,
and low on cash to pay for after-death expenses such as taxes, probate, and administration.3 Most famous instances of disputes in the
art world generally involve wealthy collectors, galleries and auction
houses,4 rather than artists, as in the Barnes Foundation litigation.5
Thus, the controversy around Indiana’s estate represents a departure
from these circumstances, as his estate is art-rich but cash-poor, unlike collectors’ estates like Barnes’s which are usually both art-rich
and cash-rich.
Therefore, Indiana represents the unusual case where an artist
entrusts his works to a museum to be created in his honor, but his
estate lacks the liquidity necessary to fulfill his wishes. Indiana’s
wish to benefit the general public with the display of his artwork
is an honorable one, and the difficulties surrounding his estate
administration can serve as an exemplar for other art-rich, cash-poor
estates on how to maximize public benefit without unduly burdening
estate resources.
Robert Indiana’s will and estate have many corresponding legal
issues that may be implicated, including estate taxes,6 the validity of
the will (since it is unclear if Indiana had the mental capacity to

Contemporary Art Market Report 2018, ARTPRICE, https://www.artprice.com/artpricereports/the-contemporary-art-market-report-2018/artists-prices [https://perma.cc/3MZ7ARJL] (the report focused on auction sales in the Contemporary Art Market, hence
targeting primarily living artists—with the exception of Basquiat’s untimely demise).
3
See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT E. ELSEN & STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW, ETHICS
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 925 (5th ed. 2007).
4
See Harriet Fitch Little, How an Artist’s Legacy Became Big Business, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 26, 2016, 9:19 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/d77d5e74-69e5-11e6-ae5b-a7cc5d
d5a28c.
5
See Daniel Grant, The Art of Art Lawsuits, HYPERALLERGIC (Feb. 4, 2014),
https://hyperallergic.com/107150/the-art-of-lawsuits/ [http://perma.cc/ZQH3-MDSS].
6
See generally Erik J. Stapper, Trusts and Estates, in ART L. HANDBOOK 1033, 1035
(Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000) (explaining that there is an estate tax threshold over which an
artist’s assets must be valued in order for tax to be assessed). Thanks to the 2017 Tax Act,
the current threshold for estate taxation is $10 million, which Indiana’s estate easily
surpasses with a valuation of $50 million. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97,
§ 11061, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (amending I.R.C. § 2010) (increasing the exemption cap
for estate and gift tax exemptions for estates or gifts made after December 31, 2017 from
$5 million to $10 million).
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make the new will in 2016),7 the valuation of the estate,8 and the
copyright infringement claims alleged by Morgan Art Foundation in
the federal litigation filed a day before Indiana died.9 However, this
Note will focus more narrowly on the feasibility of creating a

7
See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1037–39. The will appears to have followed the local
law’s (i.e., Maine’s) formalities, with the presence of adult disinterested witnesses (one
was a CPA and the other a nurse practitioner, neither of whom resided in Vinalhaven,
Maine) and executed by an attorney that was not James Brannan. See Last Will and
Testament of Robert Indiana, at 3–4 (May 7, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Indiana Will]; see also infra
Section I.A. Stapper notes that artists “working outside the mainstream of art or leading an
alternative lifestyle may leave a will that could be considered an easy target for a contest
on the ground of lack of mental capacity to make a will”; however, “eccentricity, delusions
short of insanity, or bad living habits are not sufficient to invalidate a will. The test for the
capacity to make a will is not general mental capacity; it is, rather, the ability to make a
will at the time it is made.” Stapper, supra note 6, at 1038. Indiana fits this description well,
having been isolated from the mainstream art world since the 1970s, leading an eccentric
lifestyle and living in a rundown house on a rural island in Maine. See infra Section I.A.
But, per Stapper, it does not appear that Indiana lacked the mental capacity to make the
will since the standard is so high. All that is needed is a “lucid moment, in an otherwise
disoriented life” to make a will valid. Id. at 1039.
8
See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1063–71. The value of an artist’s estate is important in
determining the amount of estate taxes, but complications arise with art, as personal
property must be measured by the fair market value of the work at time of death, which
can be hard to measure for previously unsold artworks by an artist and when the artist’s
reputation could skyrocket after his death. Additionally, valuation of an artist’s estate must
go beyond the price of unsold art and measure the stream of income that was earned in the
artist’s business. Several cases have been litigated disputing the worth of artists’ estates.
See, e.g., David Smith Estate v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), acq. 1974–2 C.B. 4, aff’d,
510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975); Georgia O’Keeffe Estate v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699
(1992); Louisa J. Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985); In re Estate of Warhol, 165
Misc. 2d. 72, 629 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1st Dep’t 1995), aff’d as modified, 224 A.D.2d 235, 637
N.Y.S.2d 708 (1st Dep’t 1996). The latter case involved a dispute over the amounts to be
paid as executor’s commission and in attorney fees, as most states set these fees as a
percentage of the estate. The lawyer who was executor of Andy Warhol’s estate was
eventually paid $3.5 million. Indiana may not have to worry about paying estate taxes since
he bequeathed all of his property to a nonprofit organization which is tax-exempt. See
I.R.C. § 642(c).
9
Complaint at 1, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018); see also MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 959–60
(referencing a similar authenticity dispute that arose after sculptor Jacques Lipchitz died
and his wife Yulla, also a sculptor, completed his unfinished, commissioned project, albeit
changing its dimensions in the process from a planned 30-foot bronze to a 20-foot-tall one;
Yulla claimed that she had been directed to do so by her husband’s mandate and was
vouched by sculptor Henry Moore who “proclaim[ed] her as the one to do the job”).
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museum out of Indiana’s house, Star of Hope, and the legal mechanisms for modifying Indiana’s will if Indiana’s wish cannot be
executed, as this Note argues is the case. In doing so, this Note will
examine the many interests involved in the resolution of the disputed
will and propose a solution that will heighten public benefit and public access to the artist’s works while also maintaining respect for the
artist’s wishes, a delicate balance over which many legal scholars
have debated. This Note will rely on the legal doctrines of cy pres
and equitable deviation, which are implicated when changed circumstances render execution of the testator’s original estate plan
impossible and modification becomes necessary, using the Indiana
case as a touchstone.
Part I outlines a brief survey of past legal controversies surrounding artists’ estates, with a close look at Robert Indiana’s
estate and ongoing litigation. Part II discusses the legal doctrines
governing the administration of estates and nonprofit corporations,
including fiduciary duties, and explains options for modifying a will
that still strive to effectuate donor intent. Previous examples of
courts applying these legal principles to art estates and foundations
will be examined and compared to the Indiana case. Part II also
discusses legal scholarship on whether the testator’s intent should
be priorit ized over the public benefit of the gift. This Note will then
argue why public benefit should prevail over dead hand control in
the case of art estates. Finally, Part III proposes solutions for artists’
estates to consider both pre- and postmortem when artists have an
honorable charitable purpose of displaying their artwork for the public benefit, but their plans for doing so are impracticable to execute.
I. BACKGROUND OF ARTISTS’ ESTATES: NO AMOUNT OF
PLANNING CAN PREPARE FOR CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Robert Indiana
Robert Indiana—born Robert Clark in 1928 in New Castle,
Indiana—was an artist and sculptor known for his assemblage, hardedge painting, and Pop art, who gained notoriety in the New York
art scene in the 1960s and 1970s and ran in the same artists’
community as Ellsworth Kelly, Agnes Martin, James Rosenquist,
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and Jack Youngerman.10 Indiana reached the pinnacle of his fame
with the success of his LOVE image in the mid-1960s, which the
Museum of Modern Art used as the image on its Christmas card in
1965.11 However, with his success came widespread unauthorized
reproduction of his work and incorrect assumptions that he was a
“sell-out.”12 By 1978,13 after he had become embittered by the New
York art world, with its rampant unauthorized copying and lack of
appreciation for his other art besides LOVE, Indiana retreated to the
remote island of Vinalhaven, an hour’s ferry ride off the coast of
mainland Maine.14 However, Indiana’s retreat wasn’t exactly inconspicuous, as he took up residence in the island’s “most remarkable
building” known as the Star of Hope, a sprawling Victorian mansion
that formerly served as an Odd Fellows Lodge.15 Indiana continued
to create art while living on this remote island, and eventually passed
away in the Star of Hope on May 19, 2018.16
A day before Indiana died,17 Morgan Art Foundation (MAF),
“Indiana’s representative since the 1990s and the owner of the
artist’s famous Love trademark,” sued the artist’s “long-time assistant, Jamie Thomas, and an art publisher, Michael McKenzie” in the
Southern District of New York federal court.18 MAF alleged that
10

See
Biography,
ROBERTINDIANA.COM,
http://robertindiana.com/biography/
[https://perma.cc/7AYQ-KRJM].
11
See id.
12
Id.
13
See id.
14
Murray Carpenter & Graham Bowley, The Artist Vanished, N.Y. TIMES (May 23,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/arts/design/robert-indiana-vanished-artist.
html [https://perma.cc/M8M9-HRKD] [hereinafter Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished].
(Vinalhaven’s 1,200 year-round residents rely primarily on granite quarries and lobster
fishing for income.).
15
Id.; see also Murray Carpenter, Robert Indiana’s Estate: Generosity, Acrimony, and
Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/arts/design/
robert-indianas-estate-generosity-acrimony-and-questions.html [https://perma.cc/2VUTGL34]. The Odd Fellows is a fraternal organization founded in England in the eighteenth
century. See Odd Fellow, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/oddfellow?s=ts [https://perma.cc/2SLQ-EVL9].
16
Jori Finkel, Robert Indiana, Whose ‘Love’ Is an Art Icon of the 20th Century, Dies at
89, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/obituaries/robertindiana-love-pop-art-dies.html [https://perma.cc/D82X-6AFT].
17
See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14.
18
Anny Shaw & Jillian Steinhauer, Will Robert Indiana’s Legacy Get Stuck in a Legal
Battle?, ART NEWSPAPER (July 19, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/
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Thomas and McKenzie exploited Indiana towards the end of his life
by “producing dubious works in his name and isolating him from
friends”;19 these allegations appear to be supported by an investigative piece timely published by the New York Times hours before
Indiana’s death had been announced.20 The lawsuit also challenges
the validity of Indiana’s will, signed and dated May 7, 2016, “which
gives Thomas power of attorney and names him as the executive
director of a museum the artist intended to be established at his home
and studio” on Vinalhaven.21
Indiana’s will expressly states his testamentary intent regarding
nearly all of his property: “[A]ll works of art created by me . . .
located at Star of Hope, Vinalhaven, Maine, or elsewhere, together
with my residence known as Star of Hope at 46 Main Street,
Vinalhaven, Maine” shall be “give[n], devise[d] and bequeath[ed]
to a 501(C)(3) not for profit organization under the Internal Revenue
Code, to be formed by my Personal Representative,” James Brannan.22 Further, Indiana stated that it is his “intent that my Star of
Hope Real Estate be restored to museum quality for use as an art
environment open to the public for visits, classes and lectures and
for the continued preservation, promotion, exhibition and use of
my Collection and Real Estate.”23 The Will then specifies that Jamie
L. Thomas of Vinalhaven, Maine, “shall serve as the Executive
Director of [the Star of Hope Foundation], for so long as he wishes,
as I know he is willing to carry out my intent and to provide for the
continued preservation, promotion and exhibition of my Collection
and use of Real Estate.”24
The Will also directs that all royalty payments received under
the “Morgan Rights Agreement dated April 9, 1999 and the ‘Morgan
Sculpture Agreement’ dated December 22, 1999 and any other . . .
rights to income and royalties” will go to the non-profit organization
news/will-robert-indiana-s-legacy-get-stuck-in-a-legal-battle
[https://perma.cc/3L344NUE]; see also Complaint at 1, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18-cv04438-AT-BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018).
19
Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18.
20
See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14.
21
Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18; see also Indiana Will, supra note 7, at 2.
22
Indiana Will, supra note 7, at 1–2.
23
Id. at 2.
24
Id.
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to help transform Indiana’s house into a museum.25 The Will further
appoints James W. Brannan as executor of Indiana’s estate, unless
he is unable to do so, in which case Jamie L. Thomas will fill the
role instead.26 Brannan appears to have worked closely with Indiana
at least since 2016, as he created the Star of Hope Foundation shortly
after the will was executed, on June 22, 2016.27 The Star of Hope
Foundation is a nonprofit corporation registered in Maine28 and is
registered with the Internal Revenue Service as a private operating
foundation rather than a public charity, which still renders it taxexempt and eligible for donations that are deductible as charitable
contributions under Internal Revenue Code Section § 170.29
As is the case with many estates of large value, there are
numerous players with vested interests in how the $50 million
worth of assets in Indiana’s estate will be utilized.30 Morgan Art
Foundation Ltd. (“MAF”) is a Bahamas limited liability company31
formed in 1993 by Mossack Fonseca,32 the now-dissolved Panamanian law firm at the center of the Panama Papers scandal.33 In the

25

Id.
Id. at 2–3.
27
Corporate Name Search, ME. DEP’T SECRETARY ST. BUREAU CORPS., ELECTIONS &
COMMISSIONS,
https://icrs.informe.org/nei-sos-icrs/ICRS?CorpSumm=20160532ND
[https://perma.cc/M3LF-4LE7].
28
Id.
29
See Details About Star of Hope, Inc., IRS, https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (select
“Organization Name” from the “Search By” drop-down menu, “ME” from the “State”
drop-down menu, and search “Star of Hope” for the search term). Although the entity is
technically registered as Star of Hope, Inc., I refer to it as the Star of Hope Foundation to
clarify its status as a nonprofit organization.
30
See Carpenter, supra note 15 (“Over the summer, an appraiser hired by Mr. Brannan
estimated the value of art contained in Mr. Indiana’s home at approximately $50 million.”).
31
Complaint at 9, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018).
32
Declaration of Hardin P. Rowley in Support of Defendant American Image Art’s
Motion to Stay at Exhibit 1 (Report Concerning Morgan Art Foundation Limited from the
Offshore Leaks Database of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,
available at https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10214036 [https://perma.cc/8GQMVG8N]), No. 1:18-cv-04438-AT-BCM (No. 102) (Nov. 6, 2018).
33
Nicola Slawson, Mossack Fonseca Law Firm to Shut Down After Panama Papers Tax
Scandal, GUARDIAN, (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
mar/14/mossack-fonseca-shut-down-panama-papers
[https://perma.cc/Z5VQ-M8KR].
The Panama Papers was a large-scale scandal in 2016 in which 11.5 million files were
leaked from the Mossack Fonseca law firm in Panama, the fourth biggest offshore law firm
26
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1990s, MAF and its advisor, Simon Salama-Caro, sought out
Indiana; during a meeting with MAF and Indiana, an agreement was
reached wherein the artist would receive 50% net-income royalties
from reproductions, promotions, and sales, in exchange for MAF
owning all the intellectual property rights to many of Indiana’s most
iconic creations, including “LOVE.”34 MAF and Salama-Caro have
been credited with “effectuating Indiana’s ‘comeback,’ which
culminated in a 2013 exhibition at the Whitney Museum, ‘Robert
Indiana: Beyond Love,’ the first major retrospective of the artist’s
works.”35 Salama-Caro received commissions on sales, and he
and his family have spearheaded the effort to compile a catalogue
raisonné of Indiana’s works.36
The defendants in MAF’s suit are Michael McKenzie, his art
publishing business, American Image Art (AIA), Jamie Thomas,
and Indiana’s Estate.37 AIA, unlike MAF, appears to have a number
of other artists besides Indiana as clients, and published two books
with Indiana imagery in the 1990s.38 McKenzie claims that his
relationship with Indiana goes back to the 1970s, and he, like

in the world. The files showed the numerous ways in which the world’s richest were
exploiting offshore tax havens. See Luke Harding, What Are the Panama Papers? A Guide
to History’s Biggest Data Leak, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016, 5:42 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers
[https://perma.cc/8HW6-ZDQW].
34
See Matthew A. Marcucci, In Pair of Lawsuits, Robert Indiana’s Former Associates
Are Vying for Control of the Late Artist’s Legacy, GROSSMAN LLP: ART L. BLOG (Aug. 30,
2018), https://www.grossmanllp.com/in-pair-of-lawsuits-robert-indianarsquos-former-a
[https://perma.cc/3DSC-PDNL]; see also Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note
14.
35
Marcucci, supra note 34.
36
Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14; see also Catalogues Raisonnés
Users’ Guide, INT’L FOUND. ART RES., https://www.ifar.org/users_guide.php
[https://perma.cc/J7L6-ZTN8]. A catalogue raisonné is a definitive guide containing all of
the works known to be made by the artist, and the author of the catalogue frequently must
make assessments as to a piece’s authenticity, thus giving these catalogues enormous
power and clout in the art world. See, e.g., Eileen Kinsella, The Warhol Market Gets Even
Wilder as Richard Polsky Releases an Unauthorized Addendum to the Catalogue Raisonné,
ARTNET (July 19, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/exclusive-richard-polskyannounces-warhol-catalogue-raisonne-addition-1026629 [https://perma.cc/96YU-B9L8].
37
Complaint at 8, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018).
38
See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14.
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MAF and Salama-Caro, takes credit for rebuilding Indiana’s reputation, including through his promotion of “Indiana’s ‘HOPE’
image, which the artist created to support the Obama campaign,”
and organizing a 2016 show at the Bates College museum.39 Unsurprisingly, asserting counterclaims against MAF that the works
McKenzie and AIA produced were “not forgeries at all but the direct
result of a successful partnership initiated by Indiana himself,”
McKenzie and AIA present a vastly different picture of the events
underlying the dispute.40 “Moreover, AIA purports to have . . . paid
the artist nearly $10 million in royalties under an agreement between
AIA and Indiana” and alleges that MAF is using the lawsuit as a
“tactic to distract from MAF’s failure to pay the artist what it owed
him.”41 The aforementioned agreement between AIA and Indiana
was undertaken in 2008 and contained an arbitration provision
which Judge Analisa Torres declared was binding, thus forcing a
stay on the S.D.N.Y. action while the parties go to arbitration.42
Jamie Thomas, over thirty years younger than Indiana, formerly
operated a seafood business on Vinalhaven before becoming
39

Id. (McKenzie co-organized the Bates College museum show alongside Landau
Traveling Exhibitions. Professor Wilmerding, a close friend of Indiana’s, traveled to the
Bates exhibition and felt that the newer pieces were in Indiana’s “vocabulary” but not
necessarily “his voice.”) Carpenter and Bowley suggest that MAF and Salama-Caro were
more well-known as the representatives of Indiana than McKenzie, especially within New
York art circles. Id.
40
Marcucci, supra note 34; see also Verified Amended Answer, Counter-Claims &
Cross-Claims of Michael McKenzie & American Image Art at 36, ¶ 282, Morgan Art
Foundation Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 3,
2018).
41
Marcucci, supra note 34. However, McKenzie and AIA likely have some culpability,
as McKenzie testified in a probate court hearing in Maine in early September that he
“returned more than 60 works to the estate since Mr. Indiana’s death.” Carpenter, supra
note 15. However, McKenzie seems prone to hyperbole, as he stated that he “had five
people on this [recovering the art works], 40 hours a week, for a month.” Id.
42
See Order to Arbitrate, Morgan Art Foundation Ltd. v. McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–
04438–AT–BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 9, 2018); see also Tiffany Hu, Artist Robert
Indiana’s Estate Can Arbitrate Dealer’s Claims, LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2018, 8:24 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1090769/artist-robert-indiana-s-estate-can-arbitratedealer-s-claims [https://perma.cc/ZAU8-4XQJ]. This Note will not be discussing the
ongoing litigation concerning MAF and AIA, except to note that these entities will be
interested in how the Star of Hope Foundation is run, as both parties stand to gain
reputation-wise and monetarily depending on their future role in the museum and ongoing
relationship with the Star of Hope Foundation.
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Indiana’s studio assistant in the 1990s and eventually graduating to
Indiana’s full-time caretaker in 2013. In 2016, Thomas was granted
power of attorney for Indiana, the same year Indiana’s will was
revised to remove Ronald D. Spencer as executive director of the
future museum and naming Thomas in his stead.43 During a probate
court hearing in Maine in early September 2018, Thomas testified
that he was paid approximately $250,000 per year to tend to Indiana,
an astounding increase from the initial $1,000 per week that he was
earning in 2013 when he started taking care of the aging artist.44
Thomas further testified that he was gifted “at least 118 pieces
[from Indiana] since 2010” and had withdrawn $615,000 from
Indiana’s accounts in the last two years of Indiana’s life, purportedly
by the artist’s request.45 Such suspicious financial activity is
alarming when combined with Thomas’s simultaneous control of
access to Indiana. There were numerous people who reported that
Thomas isolated Indiana from the outside world, with Thomas

43

See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14 (noting that in a will
executed prior to 2016, Indiana had stipulated that “his works and house . . . be transferred
to a foundation to be overseen by a New York lawyer, Ronald D. Spencer,” but Spencer
was “let go in 2016” and that same year Indiana’s power of attorney was given to Thomas,
granting him the authority to make decisions on Indiana’s behalf). Ronald D. Spencer,
counsel at Carter, Ledyard & Milburn LLP, is a prominent lawyer in the art world,
specializing in art authentication and helping art investors with attribution and provenance
of works of art. See Ronald D. Spencer, CARTER, LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP,
https://www.clm.com/attorney/spencer_ronald [https://perma.cc/M945-7XZC]. Spencer is
currently embroiled in litigation himself, after the widower of the deceased former
chairman and chief executive of the Pollock-Krasner Foundation, Charles C. Bergman,
challenged the appointment of Spencer as successor to run the Pollack-Krasner Foundation.
The widower accused Spencer of strong-arming his way into the position after representing
the Foundation for decades. The widower also challenges Spencer’s appointment as
executor of Bergman’s will. See Jillian Steinhauer, Widower Takes Aim at Chairman of
Pollock-Krasner Foundation, ART NEWSPAPER (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:58 AM), https://www.the
artnewspaper.com/news/lawsuit-faults-head-of-pollock-krasner-foundation
[https://perma.cc/DV3S-7Z5E].
44
See Carpenter, supra note 15. The probate hearing in Knox County Probate Court was
requested by James Brannan, executor of the estate, to “clear up multiple questions that
have swirled about Mr. Indiana’s finances in recent months,” including clarifying “whether
any money was owed to the estate . . . , get[ting] a solid inventory of the whereabouts of
all the art works Mr. Indiana left behind and address[ing] accusations, contained in a
separate lawsuit, that Mr. Thomas and a New York art publisher [McKenzie] had made
unauthorized works under Mr. Indiana’s name in recent years.” Id.
45
Id.
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rebuffing any and all attempts by Indiana’s friends and colleagues
to reach the artist by phone or email.46 Thomas’s appointment as
executive director of the Star of Hope museum has also been a cause
of concern, as Thomas has no background in the art world and
several parties have questioned his qualifications “to establish or run
a museum of the kind Indiana stipulated in his will.”47
Meanwhile, James Brannan, a lawyer based in Rockland, Maine,
is a somewhat questionable appointee for the executor of Indiana’s
estate.48 Brannan appears to have begun representing Indiana at least
as early as 2016, as he was the registered agent responsible for
creating the Star of Hope Foundation as a non-profit corporation in
Maine on June 22, 2016.49 Brannan has quite a host of issues to
contend with as executor of the estate, including Thomas’s suspicious conduct, including possible undue influence over Indiana50
and breach of fiduciary duty while holding Indiana’s power of attorney,51 recovery of possible money owed to the estate by MAF and
46

See Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14.
See Robert Indiana and the Importance of a Will, FREEMAN’S (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.freemansauction.com/news/robert-indiana-and-importance-will
[https://perma.cc/5J3F-6QPE]; see also Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18. Both these
publications reference remarks by Luke Nikas, MAF’s lawyer and esteemed art law partner
at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, stating that Thomas is not qualified to run a
museum of this kind and instead, “a ‘diverse board’ of specialists should manage [the
museum] and protect Indiana’s legacy and market.” Nikas recommended “collector and
curator John Wilmerding, the New York gallerist Paul Kasmin and representatives at the
Whitney Museum of American Art in New York, which staged Indiana’s retrospective in
2013, as well as the Farnsworth Art Museum in Rockland, Maine.” Shaw & Steinhauer,
supra note 18. Thomas is not entirely without a background in art, as he did help Indiana
as a studio assistant for several years, but his experience seems to have been limited to
stretching canvases. See Marcucci, supra note 34.
48
Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14.
49
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50
See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1039. Undue influence could be argued in Indiana’s case
because of the appointment of power of attorney to Jaime Thomas in 2016 and his
subsequent enlarged role in Indiana’s 2016 will—i.e., as the Executive Director of the
future museum to house Indiana’s works. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Stapper cites Georgia O’Keeffe’s will as an example of a will attacked for undue influence
“because it favored a much younger longtime assistant over the family.” See Stapper, supra
note 6, at 1039. Indiana similarly favored Thomas over any remaining family he has,
although a party trying to make this argument will likely be unsuccessful, just as
O’Keeffe’s family was. Id.
51
See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 15 (citing an incident during a visit by Brannan to
Vinalhaven shortly after Indiana’s death in which Thomas’s wife, Yvonne, handed
47
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AIA,52 accusations that Thomas and AIA “made unauthorized
works under Mr. Indiana’s name in recent years,”53 restoration of
the Star of Hope into a museum-quality building, and management
of the museum as one of its two board members.54
Brannan has already faced a dearth of cash in light of all these
issues and in November 2018, just six months after Indiana’s death,
sold off two major artworks from Indiana’s collection.55 Brannan
stated that the money was needed to pay mounting legal fees in
connection with contesting the S.D.N.Y. lawsuit, repairs needed
to fix the Star of Hope’s leaking roof, and costs for moving Indiana’s
art out of the house and into safe storage.56 Brannan is legally
entitled to sell assets of Indiana’s estate because Maine probate
law grants executors this power without any prior judicial
review needed.57
Brannan “a gym bag filled with $189,000 in cash,” telling him it “belonged to the estate”);
see also Andrew H. Hook, Durable Powers of Attorney, in 859 TAX MGMT.: EST., GIFTS,
& TR. A-3–A-5 (2000) (outlining the fiduciary duties an agent with durable powers of
attorney owes to the principal). In August 2019, Brannan filed a lawsuit against Thomas in
Knox County Superior Court in Maine, alleging that Thomas breached his fiduciary duties
by pocketing $1.1 million from the artist while subsequently allowing Indiana to live in
“squalor and filth,” despite Indiana having $13 million in the bank. See Answer for
Defendant at 12, Brannan v. Thomas, No. CV–19–19 (Me. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 2019).
See also Naomi Rea, Robert Indiana’s Estate Accuses His Caretaker of Allowing the 89Year-Old Artist to Live in ‘Squalor’ Before He Died, ARTNET (Aug. 16, 2019), https://news.
artnet.com/art-world/robert-indiana-lawsuit-claims-squalor-1627561
[https://perma.cc/FK7G-BMF3]. It is unclear why Brannan needed to sell artworks in
Indiana’s collection if the requisite funds were already available in Indiana’s bank account
upon his death. See infra text accompanying notes 55–56.
52
Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18.
53
Carpenter, supra note 15; see also Complaint at 6, Morgan Art Found. Ltd. v.
McKenzie, No. 1:18–cv–04438–AT–BCM (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2018).
54
See Carpenter, supra note 15. Thomas is the other board member of the Star of Hope
Foundation. For further discussion on potential conflicts of interest in holding dual
positions of executor and board member of the foundation, see infra Section I.D.
(examining the Rothko case).
55
See Graham Bowley & Murray Carpenter, Robert Indiana Estate to Sell Art Valued
at Up to $4 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/
arts/design/robert-indiana-estate-to-sell-art-valued-at-up-to-4-million.html
[https://perma.cc/A3P3-XRLR] [hereinafter Bowley & Carpenter, Estate to Sell Art].
56
See id.
57
See id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18–A, § 3–715 (1979) (listing building
repairs and sale of assets as transactions authorized for an executor to make without judicial
approval beforehand). Maine is also one of three states in the United States that allows
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Brannan’s decision to sell the artworks—one by Ellsworth Kelly
entitled “Orange Blue” and gifted specifically to Indiana with a special inscription on the back, the other by Ed Ruscha titled “Ruby”—
was not without controversy, as friends close to the artist including
Kathleen Rogers, his former publicist, and John Wilmerding,
emeritus professor of American art at Princeton University, objected
to the sale. For instance, Wilmerding suggested that “the Indiana
legacy was being diminished by off-loading works that were crucial
to the artist’s identity.”58 Wilmerding further stated that no sale
should occur until the members of the Star of Hope Foundation had
assessed the “artistic importance of any works to be sold.”59
Brannan reported that he had consulted a curator to determine which
pieces to sell, but declined to provide the curator’s name.60 While
the sale of these two works is lamentable and seems to demonstrate
Brannan’s willingness to deaccession Indiana’s own works as a
board member of the museum, he should be able to abstain from
further sales for the foreseeable future, as the two pieces raked in
over $6 million at the November 16, 2018 auction at Christie’s.61

estate taxes to be paid directly with works of art. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 92–
93 (1979); see also LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTY A. KING & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, ART
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 160 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that Connecticut and New Mexico, as well
as France and the United Kingdom also allow this practice of paying estate taxes directly
with works of art).
58
Bowley & Carpenter, Estate to Sell Art, supra note 55. The article cited Indiana’s
former romantic relationship with Ellsworth Kelly as the reason “Orange Blue” is so crucial
to Indiana’s collection, while the argument for keeping Ruscha’s “Ruby” is less persuasive,
as both artists working in the “verbal tradition” seems a bit tenuous of a connection. Id.
However, the article also mentions that Indiana might have bought the work because a
woman named Ruby “was accused of the murder of his stepgrandmother [sic]—an
emotional ordeal that may have been a catalyst for his parents’ divorce.” Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See Bob Keyes, Indiana-Owned Art Sells for Millions at Auction, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Nov. 17, 2018, at B2, available at https://www.pressherald.com/2018/11/16/twopaintings-owned-by-robert-indiana-sell-for-5-million-at-auction/ [https://perma.cc/NBV2
-HEBT]. Although the paintings sold for $5 million, it is unclear how much of the money
the estate will ultimately net after commission. For exact sales prices, visit the Christie’s
Post-War and Contemporary Art Auction page, accessible here: https://www.christies.
com/SaleLanding/index.aspx?intsaleid=27589&lid=1&saletitle= [https://perma.cc/A29NFZ9B].
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As Indiana never married and had few close relatives,62 it
appears unlikely that any of his assets would be reverted from the
Star of Hope Foundation to anyone in his family in the event the
foundation’s purpose to establish a museum should fail ab initio.63
The Maine Attorney General’s Office has been monitoring the
case64 because Indiana “left the assets of his estate to a charitable
organization, a nonprofit corporation known as the Star of Hope
Foundation.”65 Because there are no shareholders besides the
general public benefitting from a nonprofit corporation’s assets, the
Attorney General retains a residual supervisory duty to ensure the
assets are being properly managed.66
The Farnsworth Museum in Rockland, Maine has also been
following the case, even sending its chief curator, Michael
Komanecky, to the probate hearing proceedings in September 2018
in Knox County to learn more about the artist’s estate.67 The Farnsworth has long been a supporter of Indiana, organizing a “major
survey [of the artist’s work] in 2009—the same year [Indiana’s]
illuminated sculpture EAT was first installed on the museum’s roof.
In 2012, Indiana told The Art Newspaper that the Farnsworth would
probably inherit his collection.”68 Christopher Brownawell, the
director of the Farnsworth, says the museum is “uniquely equipped
to preserve and promote [Indiana’s] legacy and his important contributions to American art . . . . If the time arises, we will certainly
be ready, willing and able to assist.”69 Komanecky indicated that
such assistance might take the form of a Robert Indiana Center to
be developed at the Farnsworth, in conjunction with helping the
museum to be established on Vinalhaven, stating, “[t]he Farnsworth

62

Carpenter & Bowley, Artist Vanished, supra note 14.
See generally Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The
Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183 (2007) (discussing
reversionary interests in charitable gifts in the context of issues with donor standing).
64
Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18.
65
Carpenter, supra note 15. See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the Attorney General’s role in monitoring nonprofit charitable organizations.
66
See Brody, supra note 63, at 1187–88.
67
Carpenter, supra note 15.
68
Shaw & Steinhauer, supra note 18.
69
Id.
63
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remains committed to supporting Robert Indiana’s wishes for the
Star of Hope and the collection he has there.”70
B. Barnes Foundation
The most analogous case to Indiana’s is that of the Barnes Foundation.71 Dr. Albert Barnes was a chemist who made his fortune in
pharmaceuticals during the turn of the twentieth century.72
Dr. Barnes established the Barnes Foundation in 1922 “as an educational institution that would train students in Dr. Barnes’s theories
of art aesthetics.”73 Dr. Barnes erected a building in Merion,
Pennsylvania, a then-rural suburb outside Philadelphia, to house the
collection, and donated his priceless collection to the Foundati on.74
Dr. Barnes imposed many stringent restrictions in the trust indenture, charter and bylaws creating the Foundation, including specifications that the artworks remain exactly as he hung it in the building
that he had custom-designed to house his collection, bans on lending, selling, or otherwise moving the art outside the Barnes facility,
and limited hours for allowing the public to view the collection.75
The Foundation operated relatively undisturbed by litigation
until the 1990s, when little professional or private support remained
and the Foundation became strapped for cash, as investment
restrictions Barnes had put in place “hinder[ed] the facility’s maintenance and quality.”76 In 1993, the trustees proposed selling some of

70

Carpenter, supra note 15.
See Robert Indiana and the Importance of a Will, supra note 47.
72
Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations:
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 666 (1997).
73
Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and
Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 985 (2010) [hereinafter Gary, Problems
with Donor Intent].
74
See Abbinante, supra note 72, at 666–67.
75
See Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 985.
76
Abbinante, supra note 72, 672 n.43, 673 n.55 (1997) (citing Barnes Indenture and
Agreement, art. IX, ¶ 27 (Dec. 6, 1922), which mandated that the Foundation’s funds be
invested only in low-yielding government securities). There were two lawsuits in the 1950s
and 1960s, with the former requiring that the Foundation open its doors to the public or
lose its tax-exempt status and the latter allowing the trustees to charge $1 for admission to
the gallery. All told there have been “twenty-nine decisions discussing the Foundation and
its operations.” PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 280 (3d
ed. 2012).
71
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the Foundation’s “lesser” paintings to raise cash, even though any
sale was strictly verboten by the Barnes’s Indenture.77 After public
outcry, the trustees rescinded their proposal; instead, they petitioned
the local Pennsylvania court for approval to exhibit part of the
collection on a worldwide tour to raise funds, which the court
ultimately approved, finding “that the deviation was administrative
in nature and necessary to uphold the greater purpose of the
Foundation—art education.”78
Such administrative deviation commenced a long string of
lawsuits that besieged the Barnes Foundation throughout the
1990s and 2000s.79 The most significant change approved by the
Pennsylvania courts was allowing the Foundation and its collection
to be moved from Merion to downtown Philadelphia,80 a decision
that was explicitly against Barnes’s wishes. The court justified this
drastic change by grounding its decision in the doctrine of equitable
deviation rather than cy pres.81 However, it will forever remain
a mystery “[w]hether Dr. Barnes considered the directions concerning the location of the art part of his purpose restrictions or only
administrative restrictions.”82
C. Stieglitz Collection at Fisk University
Georgia O’Keeffe’s gift of the Alfred Stieglitz collection to Fisk
University in Tennessee provides another example of a donee
institution being strapped for cash and no longer able to fulfill the
donor’s wish as originally prescribed.83 Like Indiana, O’Keeffe does
not appear to have accounted for changed circumstances:
77

Abbinante, supra note 72, at 673 (citing Robert Hughes, Opening the Barnes Doors,
TIME, May 10, 1993, at 61, 62).
78
Id. at 674 (citing In re Barnes Found., No. 58–788, slip op. at 3, 7, 13, 16 (C.P. Ct.
Montgomery County, Pa., Orphans’ Ct. Div. July 21, 1992)).
79
See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 76, at 281.
80
See In re Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *19–20 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery
County, Pa., Orphans’ Ct. Div. Dec. 13, 2004).
81
Id. at *19, *19 n.13.
82
Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 987.
83
See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
See also Melanie B. Leslie, Time to Sever the Dead Hand: Fisk University and the Cost of
the Cy Pres Doctrine, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2012); Alan L. Feld, The Nature
of Fiduciary Law and Its Relationship to Other Legal Doctrines and Categories: Who Are
the Beneficiaries of Fisk University’s Stieglitz Collection?, 91 B.U.L. REV. 873 (2011).
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She gave no guidance on how Fisk should respond
to changed circumstances or as to which of her
objectives—benefitting Fisk, creating a perpetual
memorial in honor of Stieglitz, keeping the Collection together, prohibiting sale of the Collection, and
ensuring that the Collection remained in the South—
should be given priority in the event that changed
circumstances should cause them to come into
conflict.84
Ultimately the court used the cy pres doctrine to grant Fisk “permission to sell a fifty percent interest in the Collection to the Crystal
Bridges Museum in Arkansas.”85 The court reached this conclusion
after focusing on the donor’s intent of keeping the Collection in the
South,86 although there is little to no indication that O’Keeffe had
this intent in mind when she donated the collection.87
D. Mark Rothko Estate and Foundation
Finally, the overlapping administration of Mark Rothko’s estate
and foundation portend the future of Indiana’s estate. Mark Rothko
seemed to make all the right choices in his will by appointing three
close friends—one an accountant, another a painter, and the last an
anthropology professor—as executors of his estate and directors of
the Foundation that he formed before his tragic death by suicide.88
At the time, New York law limited charitable gifts to a maximum of
fifty percent of the estate and mandated a statutory minimum go to
Rothko’s widow and his minor children.89 While the house, its
contents, and $250,000 went to Rothko’s family, the remainder of

The Rose Art Museum controversy in the late 2000s is another example of a university
strapped for cash that attempted to deaccession its collection. See Gary, Problems with
Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 993–95.
84
Leslie, supra note 83, at 1, 2–3.
85
Id. at 3 (citing In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2011)).
86
See In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 593.
87
See Leslie, supra note 83, at 1, 2–3.Id.
88
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 941.
89
Id.
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his estate, including approximately eight hundred paintings, were
left to the Foundation, run by the executors of his estate.90
Unfortunately for Rothko’s children (his widow died shortly
after Rothko’s suicide), the executors of the estate breached their
fiduciary duties by entering into a highly disadvantageous, conflicted transaction91 with Marlborough Gallery, by agreeing to sell
paintings to the gallery “with a 50 percent commission, unless the
paintings were sold to or through other dealers, in which case the
commission was to be 40 percent.”92 Several terms in these agreements between the executors of Rothko’s estate and Marlborough
Gallery were highly questionable, particularly the inflated commission, as “paintings sold during Rothko’s lifetime through Marlborough had earned only a 10 percent commission.”93 As a result of the
ensuing litigation jointly filed by Rothko’s children and the New
York State Attorney General,94 all three executors were found to
have violated their fiduciary duties, were removed as executors, and
were fined between $6.4 and $9.3 million in damages.95
II. THE LAW OF WILLS, CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS, FIDUCIARY
DUTIES, AND DEVIATIONS FROM TESTATORS’ WISHES
Artists’ estates can have many corresponding legal issues, as
outlined in the introduction,96 but this Note focuses on some of the
most important problems that frequently spark legal controversy in
relation to wills and charitable foundations and the corresponding
legal remedies available for when testators’ wishes regarding their
bequests are impracticable to execute due to changed circumstances.

90

Id.; see also In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 834–35, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 932
(Sur. Ct. 1975).
91
One of the executors Rothko appointed was a director of Marlborough Gallery, while
another was an artist represented by the gallery. See In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at
842–844.
92
Stapper, supra note 6, at 1042. See also In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at 852.
93
Stapper, supra note 6, at 1042. Other questionable provisions included “interest-free
installment payments over a twelve-year period” and the “sale of so many paintings within
a short period of time.” Id.
94
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 941.
95
In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at 887, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
96
See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
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A. The Will and the Importance of Choosing Appropriate
Executors
Nearly every person dies with some property left behind, and
those who are prudent (and perhaps wealthy enough) execute a will
explaining to survivors what should be done with this leftover
property. Every state in the United States has a Probate Code
prescribing the rules to make such a will enforceable.97 Generally,
such rules define a will as a written document outlining the
deceased’s wishes and also require strictly observed formalities,
such as attestation by disinterested witnesses and a signature by the
deceased (i.e., the testator).98 In the will, the testator specifies how
she wishes to dispose of her property that remains upon her death.99
For instance, artworks are typically distributed under a will by
bequest to specific individuals or to a class.100 Indiana deviated from
these norms by bequeathing his artwork to neither of these categories, but rather to a 501(c)(3) foundation.101 Barnes did something
similar when he gifted all of his artwork to his foundation, although
his foundation was set up while he was still alive.102
One of the designations that a testator can make in a will is who
the executor (or executors) of the estate should be,103 an appointment that is crucial for artists, as executors often control the disposition of the artist’s artworks from the estate.104 With this power, the
executor can control the reputation of an artist and the value of an
artist’s works by decreeing how often, where, and to whom such
artworks are sold.105 The choice of executors and their powers is
97

ROBERT SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 141 (10th ed.
2017).
98
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003).
99
TAD CRAWFORD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE VISUAL ARTIST 225 (5th ed. 2010).
100
Id. (“A bequest means a transfer of property under a will, while a gift is used to mean
a transfer of property during the life of the person who gives the property.”)
101
See supra text accompanying note 22.
102
See supra text accompanying note 74.
103
See Crawford, supra note 99, at 226.
104
Henry Lydiate, Death of an Artist, ARTQUEST (2014), https://www.artquest.org.uk/
artlaw-article/death-of-an-artist/ [https://perma.cc/B9DL-6HRT] (discussing the powers of
an executor under British law, although the findings are equally applicable to American
estates).
105
See id.; see also MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 924; Little, supra note 4.
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unique to each estate and should be based on the artist’s own situation.106 However, the executor must be “capable of making the
necessary artistic and financial decisions for the estate.”107 On the
artistic front, a well-qualified executor for an artist’s estate would
exhibit various virtues and attributes, including “know[ing] and
car[ing] deeply about the deceased,” being “sufficiently well organized and energetic to deal with the technicalities of inventories,
valuation, [and] returns,” and knowing the applicable surrounding
law.108 Financially, the executors also must maximize the assets in
order to fulfill their fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries.109
Such attributes are difficult to find in one person alone; thus,
artists frequently appoint joint executors, with one being an art
expert and the other a financial expert, so that all of an artist’s
interests are represented adequately and the estate is well run.110
Unfortunately, such precautions still may not adequately protect an
artist’s interests, as demonstrated by the Rothko controversy, in
which the artist was seemingly prudent in appointing three close
friends with varied backgrounds as executors; yet, his estate was still
exploited and subjected to a breach of fiduciary duty.111
Indiana’s choice of attorney James Brannan as executor of his
estate does not seem to follow the usual guidelines of an artist’s
executor outlined above and appears particularly imprudent, as
Brannan lacks knowledge about Indiana’s oeuvre and may be too
heavily concerned with financials at the cost of preserving Indiana’s
collection.112 A primary tenet of trusts and estate law is effectuating
testator intent, which appears easy for Brannan to fulfill, as Indiana
clearly demonstrated his intent in his will to convert his house into
106

See Crawford, supra note 99, at 226.
Id.
108
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 924–925 (“As pointed out by Surrogate Midonick
in the Rothko case, . . . executors must have undivided loyalty or integrity, and good
judgment, firmness, independence, and active involvement.”) (citing In re Estate of
Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 847, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 943 (Sur. Ct. 1975)). See also Stapper,
supra note 6, at 1041–45; CRAWFORD, supra note 99, at 226–27.
109
See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 925.
110
See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 924 (5th ed. 2007); see also CRAWFORD, supra
note 99, at 226–27.
111
See supra Section I.D.
112
See supra text accompanying notes 48–61.
107
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a museum comprised of his artworks.113 However, Brannan’s
actions as executor have demonstrated the inherent challenge in
effectuating such intent, as Indiana’s house is crumbling and all of
his liquid assets appear to have been spent on securing counsel to
represent the estate in the federal litigation in New York.114 Thus, as
mentioned previously, Brannan had to resort to selling two works in
Indiana’s collection to pay for litigation expenses and emergency
repairs on the Star of Hope building.115
In selling off these works, Brannan has shown that he thinks
more practically rather than aesthetically when it comes to
managing Indiana’s collection and may not exhibit the appropriate
sensitivity toward and concern for the artist’s reputation. Brannan’s
readiness to sell off estate artworks is worrying. Although
Brannan did consult a curator before selling the two paintings in
November 2018, his secretiveness about the decision and his
unwillingness to disclose the curator’s identity could be a distressing
sign of how he will operate the museum as a director and potentially
deaccession more of Indiana’s works until the estate dwindles to
nothing.116 There may also be ethical concerns to consider in having
the same attorney who drafted Indiana’s will serve as executor of
Indiana’s estate and co-director of Indiana’s foundation, particularly
since Brannan receives payments for serving in all of these roles.117
B. Charitable Trusts/Foundations
Many artists have made the wise choice to create a nonprofit,
private foundation while alive, or upon their death via their will, to
avoid tax liability and ensure that their artworks are managed by
trustees or directors in an organization operating with funds of its
own and servicing the public benefit.118 Because they serve the
113

See supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
See supra text accompanying notes 47–49.
115
See Bowley & Carpenter, Estate to Sell Art, supra note 55. As mentioned previously,
such a move is not illegal, as Maine law grants “an executor the power to sell assets as he
administers the estate and there is no required judicial review.” Id.; see also supra note 57.
116
See supra text accompanying note 47.
117
See Stapper, supra note 6, at 1043–44; see also N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC. Act § 2307–a.
118
See, e.g., Little, supra note 4 (discussing foundations set up by Rothko, Salvador Dalí,
Warhol, and Moore, among others); Christa Blatchford, Are Artists’ Estates Too Protective
of Artists’ Reputations?, APOLLO MAG. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.apollo-magazine.com
114
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general public, such foundations, like the one Indiana created in
2016, are classified as charitable, in contrast to private trusts, where
the beneficiaries are a small number of named beneficiaries, who are
generally listed in the documents establishing the foundation.119
“This attribute—that charities operate for the benefit of the general
public rather than a restricted and identified class of beneficiaries—
shapes the legal accountability of charities. Donors transfer property
to a charity so that it can provide a public benefit.”120 Like the
Barnes Foundation,121 Indiana’s Star of Hope Foundation is a
“privately created and operated institution that serves the public
in some manner.”122 Another advantage of private, charitable foundations is that they are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities,
meaning they can be “potentially infinite in duration.”123
However, donors to charities, including even testators’ representatives when deceased parties bequeath gifts in their will (e.g.,
Indiana’s estate once Indiana bequeathed his collection to the Star
of Hope Foundation), generally lack the standing to sue should
the charities fail to fulfill conditions on a gift or violate fiduciary
duties.124 Because the general public is considered the “recipient” of
a charity’s benefits, no individual other than the state Attorney General in which the charity is registered has the standing to sue, thus
leaving the job of protecting the public’s interest in the charity’s
conduct to the state Attorney General.125 This legal issue of who has
standing to sue can create problems, particularly when the interest

/artists-estates-manage-reputations/ [https://perma.cc/EK2E-BC3K] (Blatchford is the
CEO of the Joan Mitchell Foundation and discussed her work carrying out artist Joan
Mitchell’s vision in directly supporting visual artists).
119
Abbinante, supra note 72, at 679.
120
Feld, supra note 83, at 874.
121
See supra Section I.B.
122
Abbinante, supra note 72, at 679.
123
Id. (quoting Roger G. Sisson, Comment: Relaxing the Dead Hand’s Grip: Charitable
Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 635 (1988)). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 27.3(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 2003).
124
Feld, supra note 83, at 874.
125
Id.; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text. For further reading on the
controversial topic of standing in the charity context, see Brody, supra note 63. See also
Kelly McNabb, What “Being a Watchdog” Really Means: Removing the Attorney General
from the Supervision of Charitable Trusts, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1795, 1800 (2012).
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in protecting the public interest diverges from the responsibility
of protecting the donor’s intent.126 Compounding problems further
is the Attorney General’s status as a politician, since “political
considerations may become part of the decision in connection with
monitoring a charitable trust, at least in high-profile cases.”127 Thus,
if Jamie Thomas or James Brannan commit fiduciary duty breaches
by mishandling Indiana’s collection in the course of their conduct as
directors of the Star of Hope Foundation, the only person legally
entitled to sue is Maine’s Attorney General.128 Indeed, the Maine
Attorney General has said that it is monitoring the Indiana litigation
proceedings, although it is unclear what legal remedies, if any, the
Attorney General could take if all of the estate assets (i.e., the art
collection) are depleted in funding the litigation and repairing the
house before the museum has a chance to be established.129
On a managerial level, the officers and directors of a charitable
enterprise, much like a for-profit corporation, “operate subject to
the twin [fiduciary] duties of care and loyalty in acting for the
institution,” with great deference given by courts to the institution’s
actions that are based on “honest judgment.”130 Thus, appointing
trustworthy directors to run the charitable corporation is crucial,
as the directors are given broad discretion in their management.131
While “[a]ll charitable not-for-profits operate subject to a non126

See Susan N. Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts: Public Benefit, Public Voice, 81 ALB.
L. REV. 565, 597 (2018) [hereinafter Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts].
127
Id. at 598. Gary cites the Hershey Trust in Pennsylvania as an example, and earlier
references the potentially political reasons the Pennsylvania Attorney General advocated
for the Barnes Foundation museum to be moved to downtown Philadelphia. See id. at 595,
598.
128
See supra text accompanying notes 63–65.
129
See id.
130
Feld, supra note 83, at 875.
131
See DUBOFF ET AL., supra note 57, at 162–63. For further reading on the vital role
trustees/directors play in nonprofit governance, see Jennifer L. White, When It’s OK to Sell
the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art
to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1041 (1996); Evelyn Brody, The
Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998); Charles Bryan Baron, SelfDealing Trustees and the Exoneration Clause: Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions
Involving Trust Property?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43 (1998); Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study
of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further
Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093 (2001); Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The
Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 279 (2002).

2019]

PRESERVING THE ARTISTIC AFTERLIFE

247

distribution rule,” meaning that the charity cannot “distribute any
part of its income to the charity’s insiders,” the charity can still
enrich its managers in other ways, including the payment of high
salaries and “elaborate fringe benefits.”132 The only constraint on
salaries imposed by tax law is a reasonableness test, wherein the
IRS must overcome the rebuttable presumption that the salary is
reasonable with sufficient evidence to the contrary, thus giving
charities considerable latitude to pay their directors handsomely.133
Such creative manipulation of director duty for unjust enrichment was seen in the Rothko case, as two of the three executors/
directors of the Rothko Foundation had direct economic ties to the
Marlborough Gallery, with whom they had contracted to consign
Rothko’s artworks.134 In a similar vein, Jamie Thomas, as attorneyin-fact for Indiana, has already made questionable ethical and financial decisions, such as withdrawing large sums of cash, increasing
his salary, and cutting off communication to Indiana from the
outside world. These actions suggest that Thomas could be held
liable for breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty; regardless of his ultimate culpability, these actions do not instill trust in
Thomas as a director of the Star of Hope Foundation.135
Besides issues of adherence to fiduciary duties, complications
can arise when an institution has a mission beyond being a
conservator of valuable artworks, such as when it also maintains the
historic preservation of a famous building housing the artworks.
In such cases, institutions “may seek to realize the monetary appreciation in its art, by way of sale or otherwise, in order to support its
other purposes.”136 These competing missions can create controversy, particularly within the museum community, where there is a
strong undercurrent of antipathy towards deaccessioning for any
purposes other than to “reinvest[] the proceeds in other artwork.”137
132

Feld, supra note 83, at 876.
Id.; see also 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958–6 (2010).
134
See supra text accompanying notes 87–94.
135
See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
136
Feld, supra note 83, at 878.
137
Id. (citing ASS’N ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING 4
(June 9, 2010) https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD%20Policy%20on%
20Deaccessioning%20website_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD2W-WUHG] (“Funds received
from the disposal of a deaccessioned work . . . may be used only for the acquisition of
133
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The Association of Museum Directors can even impose sanctions if
a museum sells artwork and plans to use the money for an operating
budget and general maintenance.138 This tension between preserving
the museum’s structure and taking proper care of the artworks was
seen in the Barnes Foundation’s move to downtown Philadelphia139
and could be implicated in Indiana’s case, as the repairs to the house
are estimated to cost $10 million.140
As appears to be evidenced in Indiana’s case, problems,
particularly liquidity issues, can emerge in carrying out the testator’s
wishes when his estate is “art-rich and cash-poor.”141 The estate’s
valuation in such a case all comes from the works of art which have
traditionally been illiquid assets, and a high valuation of the estate
results in a higher bill for taxes and probate administration.142 If the
estate does not have sufficient cash to pay the bills, “works may have
to be sold to meet sudden, large cash requirements. Such ‘distress’
sales depress the market for the artist’s work and result in disorderly
disposition of his oeuvre.”143 Indiana’s estate administration has
unfortunately already fit this description, as Brannan sold two
artworks from Indiana’s estate to abate the immediate, dire need for
large sums of cash.144

works in a manner consistent with the museum’s policy on the use of restricted acquisition
funds.”). The Policy was amended in 2015 and further limited the actions that may be taken
with the funds from deaccessioned art: “[Such] [f]unds . . . shall not be used for operations
or capital expenses. Such funds, including any earnings and appreciation thereon, may be
used only for the acquisition of works in a manner consistent with the museum’s policy on
the use of restricted acquisition funds.” Id.
138
Feld, supra note 83, at 878. Feld’s article cites an instance from 2009 wherein the
National Academy Museum in New York was penalized by the AAMD for selling two
Hudson River paintings in 2008. The penalty included a ban on loaning artworks to or
borrowing artworks from other Association members as well as any other program
collaborations. See Donn Zaretsky, AAMD Rules Need to Be Deaccessioned, ART AM.
(Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-opinion/the-market/200903-31/aamd-rules-need-to-be-deaccessioned/ [https://perma.cc/U4RN-E3WD].
139
See supra text accompanying note 82.
140
See Willy Blackmore, The Fight Over Robert Indiana’s Estate, INDIANAPOLIS
MONTHLY (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.indianapolismonthly.com/arts-and-culture/thefight-over-robert-indianas-estate [https://perma.cc/C5NH-X6BK].
141
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 925.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See supra text accompanying note 55.
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However, in this case, the cash was not for taxes or probate
administration, but instead for exorbitant litigation costs and
emergency repairs required to fix Indiana’s Star of Hope house,
which had a leaking roof.145 While the two works sold by Brannan
in November 2018 were not created by Indiana himself, many
people close to Indiana protested the works chosen as being central
to Indiana’s oeuvre and detracting from the cohesiveness of his
collection.146 Additionally, the immediacy of Brannan’s action (six
months after Indiana’s death) is a worrying sign about which side
will win out in the war between paying the cost of repairs to turn the
Star of Hope into a museum-worthy building and keeping Indiana’s
collection intact.147
C. Cy Pres and Equitable Deviation Doctrines: Balancing Public
Benefit and Donor Intent
While the law is unclear on whether the restricted gift that
Indiana bequeathed to the Star of Hope Foundation creates a charitable trust,148 the modification rules of cy pres and equitable deviation are equally applicable regardless of whether a charitable trust
was formed or Indiana’s bequest is simply a restricted gift held by
the Star of Hope Foundation, a nonprofit corporation.149 Because
charitable gifts are exempt from the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities, “the restrictions placed on a charitable gift by the donor
may last for a very long period of time.”150 While circumstances
may change over time, rendering modification of the original gift

145

See supra text accompanying notes 47–49.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–60.
147
See supra text accompany note 112.
148
Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 998 (citing the differing opinions
between RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) and Section
400(a) and (b) of PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. (The American Law
Institute Preliminary Draft No. 5 2009)).
149
Id. at 1000–01 (“Courts have applied the rules of cy pres and deviation to restricted
gifts held by nonprofit corporations, but no direct statutory authority existed for the
application of those rules . . . . [T]he modification rules of cy pres and deviation apply to
charitable trusts through trust law, to restrictions on funds held by nonprofit corporations
through [Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA)], and to
restrictions on other assets held by nonprofit corporations through case law.”).
150
See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 76, at 261; see also supra text accompanying note 123.
146
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terms necessary,151 such a change cannot be done unilaterally by
the recipient of the gift without “run[ning] the risk of suffering
a forfeiture” if such modification is found to be a violation of the
gift’s terms.152
In response to this dilemma, the equitable doctrines of cy pres
and equitable deviation have developed over the centuries to permit
charitable trusts to be saved by allowing the purpose of the gift to
be modified in the case of cy pres (i.e., a substantive modification)
or the methods by which the purpose is to be carried out to be altered
in the case of equitable deviation (i.e., a procedural modification).153
The term cy pres is taken from the French cy pres comme possible,
meaning “as near as possible,”154 and the doctrine “ties the modification to the donor’s intent,” as the “modification should be ‘as near
as possible’ to the original purpose” of the donor.155 Under this doctrine, when it becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal to carry
out the settlor’s particular purpose set out in the trust instrument due
to changed circumstances, a court will not allow the trust to fail
but will redirect the trust assets to some other charitable purpose
“that reasonably approximates the designated purpose.”156 There
is generally a preference by courts to keep the trust intact, with
modification, rather than let it fail and go through reversion.157
A determination of a general charitable intent used to be
evaluated in courts,158 but over time courts rarely allowed a gift
to fail and revert to the donor’s heirs; instead, the majority of states,
including Maine, have adopted the Uniform Trust Code, which
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Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 1022.
GERSTENBLITH, supra note 76, at 261.
153
Id.
154
Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 1023 n.288 (noting that per
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003), cy pres does not
literally require the “substitute or supplementary purpose to be the nearest possible but one
reasonably similar or close to the settlor’s designated purpose, or ‘falling within the general
charitable purpose’ of the settler”).
155
Id. at 1023.
156
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
157
See id. at § 67 cmt. b.
158
15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 147 (2011).
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“creates a presumption of general charitable intent.”159 The courts
are required to make a judicial finding of the donor’s intention
as applied to new conditions, although cy pres is a liberal rule of
construction to carry out, not defeat, the settlor’s intent.160 While
changed circumstances generally occur many years after the gift has
first been put to use by the charity, “[c]y pres can also be applied to
new gifts, most commonly in the case of bequests.”161 The most
important issue in a cy pres case is the intent of the testator, and this
intent “depends on documentation at the time of the gift and not
thoughts about what a donor might have intended under changed
circumstances, but the discussion of donor intent includes thoughts
about later intent as well as intent at the time of the gift.”162
Equitable deviation (or deviation), by contrast, does not “modify
a restriction on the purpose of a gift,” but instead modifies “a
restriction on how the charity carries out the purpose.”163 Cy pres
focuses on shifting the intent of the donor, while deviation permits
an administrative change that will help the charity carry out the
donor’s intent.164 The distinction between the two doctrines is often
tenuous and can be manipulated based on how a party wants to
characterize the situation to achieve their desired outcome.165 For
example, the parties in the Barnes Foundation litigation reclassified
changes as cy pres or equitable deviation depending on which side

159

Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra note 126, at 585. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18–B, § 413 (2003) for the Maine statute implementing the Uniform Trust Code. I have
included mention of Maine as that is the state where Indiana’s will was probated.
160
15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 144 (2011). For more on the issues involved in
determining settlor’s intent, see Heinrich Schweizer, Settlor’s Intent vs. Trustee’s Will: The
Barnes Foundation Case, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 63 (2005).
161
Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1115 n.10 (1993)
(“Here, typically owing to the lapse of time between death and the execution of the will,
the donor would have been unaware when the gift became effective of circumstances that
would preclude precise execution of his or her wishes within the confines of legally defined
charitable purposes”).
162
Gary, Problems with Donor Intent, supra note 73, at 978 n.2.
163
Id. at 978–79 (emphasis added).
164
Id. at 979.
165
Abbinante, supra note 72, at 685. Abbinante cites the Barnes Foundation dispute as a
perfect example of such manipulation. Id. at 686.
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they were advocating for, and the court ultimately relied on administrative deviation to make changes that completely altered the purpose of Barnes’s trust and went against his wishes as the donor.166
In Indiana’s case, the changed circumstances occurred much
earlier than for the Barnes Foundation, as Indiana’s wish appeared
to be impracticable to carry out even at Indiana’s death, as he left
his house in too run-down of a condition; moreover, the prohibitive
cost of restoring the house to museum quality will far outweigh any
potential benefits that the museum could bring.167 This is especially
true since the renovation seems likely to deplete all of the estate’s
assets—i.e., the artworks in Indiana’s collection—since there are no
other funds available to pay for the restoration. Thus, the trustees of
Indiana’s foundation will probably have to petition the court in short
order to alter the terms of the trust, and it remains to be seen whether
such modification will be advocated as a cy pres or equitable deviation change. If the trustees and the court adopt my suggested solution put forth below, then the cy pres doctrine could be utilized to
allow Indiana’s charitable purpose to be adhered to closely, yet the
result will be a drastic shift of location for Indiana’s art collection.
D. Is It Time to Relinquish Dead-Hand Control? Legal Scholars’
Response to Cy Pres and Equitable Deviation
Various legal scholars have argued in the wake of costly lawsuits
due to changed circumstances such as the Barnes Foundation and
O’Keeffe’s gift to Fisk University that the application of the
doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation should be amended or
that the doctrines should be eliminated altogether.168 However, these
scholars have disagreed as to whether such amendments should
involve following more closely the settlor/testator’s intent in
making the gift or abandoning such dead-hand control and focusing
solely on maximizing the public benefit of the charitable gift.169
Chris Abbinante is perhaps one of the staunchest advocates for
adhering to donor intent. He argued in his influential Comment that
166

See id. at 686–87; see also supra text accompanying note 82.
See Blackmore, supra note 140.
168
For an excellent overview of various scholars’ proposals for amending the cy
pres/deviation doctrines, see Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra note 159, at 600–07.
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See id. at 600; see also Abbinante, supra note 72, at 705.
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the Barnes case demonstrated “the legal system’s failure to uphold
donor intent in the face of charitable-foundation trustees who wish
to deviate from that intent.”170 Abbinante proposed adopting an
additional legal hurdle for litigants to overcome when asking courts
to rule on cy pres or administrative deviation petitions.171 This
additional step would require courts to focus their initial inquiry on
the necessity of the deviation, with a “rebuttable presumption
against permitting any type of deviation from the intent of the donor,
which can be overcome only when a trustee makes a showing of
indisputable need.”172 Abbinante stated that the threshold test should
be framed as a two-part inquiry to the parties seeking to deviate from
the donor’s wishes: “(1) Have all reasonable efforts to comply with
the terms of the [trust agreement] been exhausted? and (2) Will the
foundation fail in its purpose if the desired deviation is not
allowed?”173 Abbinante argued that failure of purpose only refers to
impossibility or illegality and thus would eliminate petitions for cy
pres and/or administrative deviation that only seek to modify based
on impracticality.174 Abbinante acknowledged that this added legal
threshold might cause more trusts to fail, but posited that this outcome could be avoided if donors exercise more foresight and implement contingency plans and plan ahead for alternative uses of their
trust assets in anticipation of changed circumstances.175
On the other end of the spectrum, several scholars have advocated for greater consideration of the public’s interest in a charitable
gift, although these scholars have differed on how much deference
should be given to the public interest.176 Ilana Eisenstein and John
170

Abbinante, supra note 72, at 705.
See id.
172
Id.
173
See id. at 705–06.
174
Id. at 706. Abbinante averred that impracticality is too nebulous of a standard and
allows courts and trustees to deviate from donor intent when such deviation is convenient
or “suitable to their ulterior motives, such as efficiency.” Thus, he argued that
impracticality should be rejected as grounds for modifying a donor’s intent. Id. at 706
n.240.
175
Id. at 707.
176
See Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra note 126, at 605 (citing Katie
Magallanes, Ilana H. Eisenstein, and John Nivala as scholars who have advocated for
courts to direct their consideration to public interest when determining whether to modify
a charitable gift).
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Nivala agreed that the public has a strong interest in gifts that represent “the droit patrimoine,” i.e., “our collective cultural inheritance.”177 Both Eisenstein and Nivala argued that public interest
should be protected even if the donor intent clearly contradicts such
interest, as was demonstrated in the Barnes Foundation case.178
Melanie Leslie advocated for a sort of middle ground between
dead-hand control and public benefit by arguing that a legal rule
should be adopted “limiting the duration of restrictions on charitable
donations.”179 She proposes putting in a time constraint of forty
years to enable donors to restrict the use of their gift for a “reasonable period” but argues that such a restriction would “greatly reduce
litigation over changed circumstances and the accompanying waste
of charitable and public dollars.”180 Leslie argued that cy pres should
still apply within the first forty years and that the law should grant
standing to the donor or the donor’s heirs to enforce the terms of the
charitable gift within that time frame.181 However, after the fortyyear period has lapsed, and in the event that a charity can no longer
comply with the donor’s restrictions on the gift, Leslie states that the
charity should be free to use the gift as they see fit, subject to its
fiduciary duties of “care, loyalty and obedience to mission.”182
Leslie avers that the Attorney General would still have the power to
177

Id. (citing Ilana H. Eisenstein, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes
Foundation and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of
Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1747, 1783–86 (2003)). Gary also notes that Nivala
used the Barnes Foundation as an example of such cultural heritage, as the collection, when
displayed, represents “an intellectual, emotional and cultural experience.” Id. at 605 n.341
(quoting John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, The Public Interest, and
Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 477, 480 (2003)).
178
See Eisenstein, supra note 177, at 1785–86; Nivala, supra note 177, at 481.
179
Leslie, supra note 83, at 16.
180
Id. It is unclear why Leslie chose forty years as the appropriate time period, and other
scholars have written similar proposals with differing durations, including Alex Johnson,
who argued that the duration should be the same as that governed by the Rule Against
Perpetuities since this time frame represents the law’s balancing of the rights of the present
generation against the rights of future generations. See Alex M. Johnson Jr., Limiting Dead
Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U.
HAW. L. REV. 353, 354, 355, 391 (1999); see also Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts, supra
note 126, at 600–04 (citing a number of different legal scholars’ proposals for loosening
the rules around modifying a charitable gift after a set number of years).
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See Leslie, supra note 83, at 16.
182
Id. at 16–17.
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enforce the donor restrictions should the charity violate these fiduciary duties, but only after the initial forty-year period has lapsed.183
Rob Atkinson has endorsed another alternative to court modification of the charitable gift: giving the power to make key decisions
in changed circumstances to the trustees or directors of the charity,
subject to their fiduciary duty.184 The trustees would be legally
empowered to use the assets as they see fit, but would be constrained
by “what the state defines as charitable through common law, legislation, or administrative regulation,” and by “extralegal mechanisms
to enforce donor intent.”185 The Attorney General would still
intervene should the trustees breach their fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, but the donor’s restrictions placed on the gift would
henceforth only carry moral weight.186 Atkinson argued that the
donor’s threat of cutting off future support to the charity would be
serious enough to act as a safeguard for the charity trustees to adhere
to their fiduciary duties.187
Many of the solutions just described are inapt to solve the
dilemma that arises when an artist only leaves behind their artworks
and has no liquid assets to carry out their wishes, as is the case with
Indiana’s estate. An artist’s estate requires special care in maintaining the collection which can easily be mishandled by inexperienced
or self-serving trustees, as was seen in the Mark Rothko controversy
and appears likely to occur with Brannan and Thomas serving as
trustees, neither of whom have art-world experience. Thus,
Atkinson’s proposal to delegate important decisions to fiduciaries
when changed circumstances arise would likely lead to more
fiduciary breaches, particularly if artists appoint trustees who are
self-interested in carrying out transactions or have no experience in
the art world and therefore likely do not know the best way to preserve an artist’s oeuvre.

183
184
185
186
187

Id. at 17.
See Rob Atkinson, supra note 161, at 1143.
Id.
See id. at 1144.
See id.
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Additionally, Abbinante’s proposal of eliminating impracticality as a justification for modifying a charitable gift would unnecessarily constrain trustees and courts, since the heightened standards
of impossibility and illegality seem exceedingly difficult to prove
and would cause more trusts to fail, as Abbinante admitted.
Further, Abbinante was too optimistic in hoping that donors would
exercise more foresight and develop contingency plans, as demonstrated by the previous cases as well as the ongoing litigation
shrouding Indiana’s estate. Artists seem especially prone to lacking
the foresight to develop backup plans should their initial wishes be
impracticable to fulfill. But under Abbinante’s proposal, Indiana’s
wish to create a museum out of his rundown house on an isolated
island in Maine is not necessarily impossible to fulfill, but it is
highly impracticable, as the estate has no liquid assets and would
need to sell off one-fifth of Indiana’s art collection just to restore the
Star of Hope house to museum quality.188 Thus, under Abbinante’s
proposal, because Indiana failed to implement a contingency plan,
his trust would likely fail, as all the artworks in the collection would
be sold off in order to pay for the creation of the museum to
house them.
III. SOLUTION
While no two cases are alike, each prior instance of
complications related to an artist’s estate provides helpful precedent
for artists creating their estate plans now. The Barnes Foundation,
like Indiana’s future museum, was in a geographically isolated area,
which hindered the museum’s generation of profits and ultimately
led the Foundation to fall into dire straits. Indiana’s estate should
thus exercise caution in opening a museum on Vinalhaven, as it is
significantly harder to reach than Merion was for the Barnes
Foundation and it is unclear how the museum would attract a sufficient number of visitors to a remote island in order to offset the
substantial overhead costs of running a museum. Additionally, like
the Barnes Foundation, Indiana’s estate runs the risk of becoming

188

See supra text accompanying note 140.
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bankrupt if the litigation carries on for a long time, further draining
what little liquid assets the estate has.
In contrast to Barnes’s indenture, however, Indiana’s will is
much less detailed and gives Brannan and Thomas as directors
of the Foundation considerably more flexibility in running the
museum. This flexibility should allow them to seek out more creative solutions and potential fundraising avenues that Barnes’s
indenture strictly forbade.189 However, even with such a detailed
indenture, the court in the Barnes case still applied equitable deviation to blatantly go against the donor’s intent, a move that should
sound alarm bells for future donors wishing to make restricted gifts.
The court in the Fisk University case faced a similar dilemma
with the Stieglitz Collection, yet employed cy pres in that case to
apply its own definition of O’Keeffe’s donative intent. A comparison of the Fisk University and Barnes Foundation cases demonstrates the inherent subjectivity of cy pres/administrative deviation
analysis, and the arbitrariness of courts in applying these doctrines.
Thus, Indiana’s estate should exercise caution in seeking judicial
approval of any modifications that it may make, and try to frame
such changes as administrative deviation, since that seems to grant
greater flexibility to directors of nonprofit corporations than cy pres.
Finally, the breaches of fiduciary duty in Mark Rothko’s case
should serve as a cautionary tale for the fiduciaries involved in
managing Indiana’s estate, since Rothko exercised care in who he
chose as executors of his estate and these “close friends” still blatantly breached their duties of care and loyalty. Unfortunately,
Thomas already appears to demonstrate the sort of erratic behavior
indicative of a breach of fiduciary duty by abusing his power of
attorney and exerting undue influence over Indiana. Time will tell if
Thomas and Brannan can avoid the kind of conflicted transaction
in which Rothko’s executors engaged, although Thomas appears to
have already completed such a transaction with McKenzie and AIA,
if MAF’s allegations prove to be founded.
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Generally, cy pres applies after a sufficient period of time has
passed, and it has been demonstrated that the intent of the donor
can no longer be carried out based on the current condition of the
foundation. However, it appears from the outset that the Star of
Hope Foundation faces an uphill battle, as it is tethered to a rundown
and remote house that needs emergency funds for extensive
repairs.190 The Star of Hope’s disrepair was so bad it necessitated
the emergency transport of Indiana’s works to a storage facility,
as the house was too unfit for proper artwork storage.191 With
Indiana’s estate being art-rich and cash-poor, there is no hefty
endowment like the Barnes Foundation had, and it seems that deaccessioning will be necessary perhaps from the outset (as has already
been seen with Brannan selling off two valuable works in Indiana’s
collection simply to pay for the roof repairs and litigation fees).192
Thus, the circumstances seem to have changed sufficiently from
when Indiana drafted his will to justify modification—the real
question is whether such a modification would require the use of cy
pres or if equitable deviation would suffice.
Unfortunately, Indiana did not plan for any changed circumstances aside from the possibility that either Brannan or Thomas
would decline their duties as executor or director, respectively.
Thus, the question of donor intent is left to the court to make a
subjective judgment call. Additionally, the only parties who can
request such a modification of Indiana’s will are the Attorney General of Maine and Thomas and Brannan as directors of the Star of
Hope Foundation.193 Moving the collection to the Farnsworth
Museum seems like the best solution because the intended beneficiaries of Indiana’s estate are arguably Maine’s citizens, expanding
the public benefit beyond the tiny town of Vinalhaven, with its 1,200
residents. This solution appropriately balances the donor’s intent
and the public benefit, a balance over which many scholars have
debated.194 Indiana’s remarks to The Art Newspaper in 2012 that the
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Farnsworth would probably inherit his collection point to his predilection for the museum and indicate that he would perhaps not object
to his collection being housed there if the Star of Hope cannot
feasibly be converted into a museum.195 Additionally, the public
benefit still remains with Maine and would be sufficiently isolated
from the mainstream that Indiana so despised as to likely satisfy the
reclusive and embittered artist. While Indiana had an honorable
primary purpose of converting his formerly grand house into a
museum, prudence will hopefully prevail here and the maximum
public benefit for the art collection will be prioritized over the costly
renovation of Star of Hope. This focus on the public benefit has the
added bonus of allowing many more visitors to see the collection
(and the collection to remain much larger) than would likely be the
case if it remained on Vinalhaven.
CONCLUSION
This Note examined how changed circumstances can apply to a
testator’s wishes soon after his or her death—as demonstrated by
Robert Indiana’s request to turn his house into a museum to display
his collection, which wish is impracticable from the outset. Based
on prior cases such as the Barnes, Rothko, and Fisk, it is unclear
whether either the cy pres or deviation doctrines would remedy this
impracticability in a satisfactory manner. Thus, artists should be
particularly careful to draft their wills to provide for alternative
plans in the event of changed circumstances. By doing so, they will
exercise the necessary foresight that Indiana lacked, as he provided
no alternatives should the museum be impracticable to establish.
Time will tell how much money gets swallowed up in the ongoing
litigation and the cost of repairing the Star of Hope. However,
Indiana’s case will hopefully serve as a cautionary tale to artists to
consider the liquidity of their estates and the feasibility of creating
museums when they have no cash flow to accompany their collections, and to consider other alternatives that still keep their
collections in the public eye and provide long-lasting public benefit.
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